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More Challenges to RF Democrats
Interview with Father Gleb Bakunin
By KEITH ARMES
[Father Gleb Yakunin, Deputy of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and a 
member of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Freedom of Conscience, was 
interviewed by Keith Armes, Editor of Perspective, on October 14, 1992, in 
Tacoma Park, Maryland.]
Perspective: Is there any effective parliamentary oversight of the security organs 
and the military?
Essentially the security organs and the army are out of control. The parliamentary 
Committee on Security and Defense has no real power. In practice, it is unable to 
supervise the KGB or the army. It has no power to ensure implementation of its policies. 
Some members of the committee work for the KGB. The committee chairman himself, 
[Sergei] Stepashin, is a deputy minister with the Ministry of Security (MSRF) and head 
of its St. Petersburg division. It's difficult for him to work effectively--how can he be 
supposed to supervise his own boss?
Perspective: How do you view the disposition of forces currently in parliament?
In rough terms, the Communists of Russia are on the right, in the center is the Civic 
Union of [Arkady] Vol'sky, [Aleksandr] Rutskoi and [Nikolai] Travkin, and then there is 
our left bloc, Democratic Russia. As far as opposition to the communists is concerned, 
we are ready to collaborate with the Civic Union, but with regard to our views and our 
approach to reforms, we have differences of principle with it. We are very afraid that 
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while the Civic Union gives lip service to supporting the reforms, in fact its line is one of 
braking and holding up the reforms, and this is extremely dangerous--indeed it may be 
fatal and result ultimately in a social explosion. Consequently we are extremely 
alarmed, and we are doing everything we can to support [Yegor] Gaidar personally and 
his team of reformers. But if Yel'tsin removes Gaidar, we would be ready to go into 
opposition.
Perspective: What are the relations between your Committee on Freedom of 
Conscience and [Supreme Soviet speaker Ruslan] Khasbulatov?
We are actively fighting him. He has been establishing an enormous staff of advisers for 
himself--a greatly excessive number. In this way he's been strengthening the 
infrastructure over the Supreme Soviet and its commissions and committees, while the 
commissions and committees themselves don't have enough staff.
Perspective: What view do you take of the activity of Khasbulatov? As you know, 
Otto Latsis has written in Izvestia that he is responsible for a "usurpation of 
power."
We are one of the groups that are most actively promoting the creation of an anti-
Khasbulatov bloc. We've carried out a political offensive against him. We consider his 
activity to be absolutely unacceptable--he's committed too many violations and he 
issues too many anticonstitutional directives (postanovleniya). Finally, it's absolutely 
unacceptable that he appointed Gen. Achalov, an active member of the State 
Emergency Committee [August 1991 putsch group], to head an expert commission. 
During the putsch, Achalov is said to have been an active advocate of storming the 
White House.
Perspective: ... He's appointed a lot of people from V.I. Boldin's apparatus, too--
[Yuri] Voronin and others...
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That's right, a whole group of CPSU TsK members--as well as Gorbachev people--who 
are only capable of braking the reforms. Currently our struggle against Khasbulatov has 
died down somewhat, since there's an informal agreement with him that we will not 
continue to fight him on the condition that he stops fighting Gaidar.
Perspective: What are the reasons for the great power that Khasbulatov holds 
over deputies?
He's managed in one way and another to subordinate the Supreme Soviet to himself 
and turn it into a kind of state office (kontora) under his direction. He holds excessive 
power over the deputies. He exercises control over the committees through the system 
of foreign trips [for deputies]. He personally controls which deputies get to travel abroad. 
Lev Ponomarev and I have never once travelled abroad at the expense of the Supreme 
Soviet. He provides the deputies whom he sends abroad with a $30 per diem, if they 
don't already receive a travel allowance. These are substantial amounts. One can speak 
in terms of Khasbulatov's "personal machine" (personal'naya mashina)--deputies are 
given apartments and dachas.
Given the mentality of our deputies, most of whom in the past had always been 
members of the apparatus system, they very easily succumb to such influences. We 
have a very difficult situation with him--but that's the reality today.
Consequently, as far as the political future is concerned, a great deal depends on 
Khasbulatov personally. If he restrains the "red-browns," the Supreme Soviet will be 
able to pass some more or less tolerable, if not progressive, legislation. On the other 
hand, if he starts to wage war against the president, the democrats won't have much of 
a chance.
Perspective: How do you view the inclusion of members of the military-industrial 
complex, for instance [Georgi] Khizha, in the government?
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Khizha's joining the government was not a catastrophe, although it did alarm us. In fact, 
the job was offered to him by [Anatoli] Chubais, who had known him for a long time. As 
far as [Victor] Shumeiko, a former deputy of Khasbulatov, is concerned, thank God he's 
closer to the reformers than the centrists. However, Yel'tsin's last speech in which he 
criticized [Industry Minister Andrei] Nechaev alarmed us greatly, since after all Nechaev 
is an advocate of reforms.
The fact that Yel'tsin now seems to be putting his faith [delaet stavku] in the centrists 
very much disturbed us. However, it's entirely possible that this may be a political 
maneuver, and he is trying to reconcile us with the centrists, and to save the 
government and the presidential special powers. As you know, these special powers will 
expire in the near future, and it's clear that for Yel'tsin this will present the very difficult 
problem of how to proceed, because if the special powers are cancelled, the cabinet will 
be thrown to the wolves. For this reason we categorically advocate the renewal of the 
totality of the special powers. Otherwise, the reactionary majority [in parliament] will 
install ministers who will ensure that all the reforms are nullified. The possibility exists 
that this will happen. Consequently we will be engaged in a difficult, stubborn struggle 
during the next few months.
Perspective: Do you agree with Gavriil Popov that it was inevitable that the old 
nomenklatura would end up in power under Yel'tsin?
This is very far from being the case. When we look at the series of appointments of 
oblast' governors (gubernatory) that were made, it's clear that Yel'tsin could have 
appointed a lot more democrats than he did. The same holds for other state structures. 
He's surrounded himself with retreads.
Perspective: What is your view of the role of the State Security Council and the 
appointment of Yuri Skokov?
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The council possesses too much real power--although it is supposed to be only a 
consultative organ. It's turned out to be an extraordinarily effective and powerful body, 
which works in a far from democratic way. Skokov has never been a democrat and was 
never a supporter of democratic reforms. All these people have a mentality that makes 
them perform correspondingly, and the effect of their influence is to brake reforms. Take 
Yuri Petrov, the head of the presidential apparatus, who has been interfering in too 
many matters. It would be completely acceptable if he confined himself to his own 
narrow area of managing the apparatus, but we believe that he has expanded his 
powers, and interferes so as to have great impact in a number of other areas of 
administrative activity.
Perspective: ... In your opinion, Petrov has excessive influence on Yel'tsin?
Certainly he does, enormous influence. He's an ex-obkom secretary, Yel'tsin's 
successor [in Sverdlovsk], then later he served in Cuba. I don't have anything against 
him personally, but it's clear that an active democrat ought to be occupying his position--
a person with democratic views, who would pursue a democratic course. Clearly people 
like this around him exercise pressure on Yel'tsin. Yel'tsin talks to them every day, and 
it's evident they create a certain background, and that they have a psychological impact 
on him. The danger is that Yel'tsin will simply move to the right.
Perspective: What is your view about the holding of new elections?
Of course, in principle we are for new elections. Ninety percent of the deputies in 
parliament were communists. Even if many have now changed their red coloration, 
these people have not given up their apparatus style, and their nomenklatura--
administrative methods of administration. Very many deputies are classic apparatchiks.
Nevertheless, although new elections are unquestionably necessary, it's obvious that 
we need to go into elections at a time that it is favorable. Only a political madman or 
someone without political experience would plan to hold new elections now. We have 
5
entered a stage of shock therapy, [a] rupture of the old structure. The standard of living 
has fallen, in the near future there is going to be heavy unemployment, and it is natural 
that right now we are being cursed by many of our voters who originally had 
enthusiastically supported democracy.
If new elections were held today, the communists would come to power again. Of 
course we are in favor of new elections in principle, but not under [the] present 
conditions. When we emerge from the economic crisis [we can hold elections]. The 
current [parliamentary] term has two and a half years to go. In two years' time there is 
every chance that the country will have overcome the economic crisis. If this happens 
and living standards begin to improve significantly, we will have every chance of coming 
out afloat and proving capable of political action. Then we will not end up in opposition, 
but be able to continue carrying out historic reforms.
Perspective: What are the main problems that Democratic Russia is having in 
building political support?
The greatest danger we face is the lack of a financial base. Travkin's party and the 
centrists have a financial base, the Industrial Union has a powerful financial base, and 
so do the communists, but we don't, and we get no support from the state. It is only now 
that we are getting help from mid-sized and small businesses, which [are] beginning to 
understand that they need us as much as they need air, and to realize that [they] cannot 
survive unless democracy comes out victorious. But this support we get from business 
is still very weak. If we had a proper financial base our political strength would be much 
greater.
Our great hope at the moment is our second echelon, so to speak--the Public 
Committees for Reform (OKR), which are now represented in 60 oblasti. The 
committees are essentially controlled by Democratic Russia, although the OKRs have 
opened their doors wide for all other organizations to become members as well. These 
committees provide us with a political base for the next elections.
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Perspective: How great in your view is the danger of a new totalitarianism--of 
antidemocratic forces gaining power? What if the economic situation deteriorates 
further?
Everything depends on the economy--how much worse the economic situation gets, 
and how long it remains that way. I consider that the next six months will be the most 
critical, but if we get out of this crisis successfully, I don't believe there are any grounds 
to believe that there will be a rebirth of totalitarianism.
Perspective: Do you believe that a democratic system (stroi) has now become 
substantially rooted in Russia?
Yes, I believe that, to a large extent, people have now become used to enjoying 
freedom of speech and of action in our country, and that we can rely on the civic 
consciousness of our citizens.
Perspective: So you are relatively optimistic about the prospects for democracy, 
provided that the economic situation does not deteriorate greatly?
Yes, I am--on that condition.
Perspective: If the economic situation does improve, would you expect new 
elections to result in a stable democratic majority?
Yes, at least we hope so. The most important thing now is that unquestionably the 
power of the communists has been significantly weakened.
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